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REGULATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS VIA THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE - THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Reba Graham Rasor
INTRODUCTION
Probably no act passed by Congress during this generation has
evoked a storm of debate, both in and out of Congress, equal to that
caused by the Public Accommodations Title of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The bill was before Congress for thirteen months-longer,
it is said, than any other in history. After passage, the act's validity
was immediately challenged in cases which focused man-on-the-street
attention on the United States Supreme Court and issues of constitu-
tional law with an intensity not seen since the 193 O's, when the Court
overturned major New Deal legislation.
It is difficult to imagine a subject more unsuited to detached, aca-
demic discussion. Nevertheless, this Comment will attempt to deal
with the statutory scope of the act and the extent to which it may
constitutionally be applied in an approach divorced from considera-
ions of the merit or wisdom of the legislation.
Discussion will be divided into these six parts: (1) contents of
the statute, (2) historical development of the commerce clause, (3)
previous application of the commerce power in racial discrimination
cases, (4) previous cases applying the fourteenth amendment to pre-
vent discrimination, (5) decisions upholding the public accommo-
dations title, and (6) future developments.
I. CONTENTS OF THE STATUTE
Of basic importance is determining exactly what business Congress
intended the act to cover. The opening section declares the right of
all persons to patronize "any place of public accommodation . . .
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion or national origin."' The remainder of the section is devoted
to explicit definition of a "place of public accommodation," a point
crucial to both the practical effectiveness and constitutional validity
of the title.
First, invoking its fourteenth amendment powers, Congress de-
clared that a place of public accommodation is any establishment
where "discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (1964) (hereafter cited
as Civil Rights Act of 1964; citation to Statutes at Large will be omitted).
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action. ' The requisite state action is declared to exist if "discrimi-
nation or segregation (1) is carried on under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, or regulation; or (2) is carried on under color of any
custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State or
political subdivision thereof; or (3) is required by action of the
State or subdivision thereof."'
Then, calling on Congress's powers under the commerce clause, the
act further defines place of public accommodation as any of four
types of businesses if its operations "affect commerce." The four
categories are:
(1) Any place which provides lodging for transient guests, un-
less it contains not more than five rooms for rent and is used by
the proprietor as his residence.
(2) Any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda
fountain or other facility principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such
facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any
gasoline station.
(3) Any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena,
stadium or other place of exhibition and entertainment.
(4) Any business which is physically located within the premises
of a covered establishment or any establishment which contains
within its premises a covered establishment.!
Different criteria for each of the four categories determine whether
establishments affect commerce. In the first category, inns, hotels
and motels are presumed to affect commerce simply by being such
businesses. But in the second category, the restaurant or gasoline sta-
tion is presumed to affect commerce only either if it serves or offers
to serve interstate travelers or if a substantial portion of the food or
gasoline it sells has moved in commerce. Theaters and places of enter-
tainment in the third category affect commerce within the meaning
of the act if they customarily present films, performances, athletic
teams, exhibitions or other sources of entertainment which move in
commerce. Category four businesses are presumed to affect commerce
if they share the same physical premises with a business covered by
the act.'
Specifically excluded from the act is "a private club or other
establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent
that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the
'Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 (a) (b) (1964).
3 Ibid.
4 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201 (b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1964).
'Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201 (c), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000a(b) (1964).
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customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of sub-
section (b)" [the four enumerated categories above].'
Many other businesses are excluded by implication. A partial list
would include service and professional establishments, such as a
doctor's office, a barber shop, a beauty shop or dry cleaning shop,
unless located in a covered business such as a hotel or in an office
building with a covered restaurant. An apartment house or boarding
house would not be covered if the persons renting rooms could be
classified as permanent rather than transient occupants and if it does
not serve food which has moved in commerce. Bowling alleys and
skating rinks would seem not to be covered unless they contain a
restaurant, nor would swimming pools be covered unless a restaurant
is on the premises. Bars are not covered unless located in a covered
establishment, such as a hotel or restaurant, or unless they serve
enough food to be a "facility principally engaged in selling food."'
Remedies offered in the title are as sweeping as they are unique.
Section 203 states that "no person" shall interfere with any person's
enjoyment of privileges secured by the act. Specifically forbidden are
(a) withholding or attempting to withhold the privileges secured by
the title; (2) intimidating, threatening or coercing any person with
the purpose of interfering with these privileges; or (c) punishing or
attempting to punish any person for attempting to exercise these
privileges. The first two are self-explanatory. The third raises a ques-
tion. Is the arrest and imprisonment of persons who enter a segregated
business against the wishes of the owner unlawful? If so, Congress
has by statute accomplished that which the Supreme Court in a long
series of increasingly hard-fought decisions had avoided deciding on
the basis of the fourteenth amendment.! That is, the act has given
sit-in demonstrators a defense against prosecution under state trespass
statutes, but only, of course, if the demonstrators can show that the
business is covered by the federal act. It seems unlikely, however,
that the cases will come up in this posture because the title offers
other remedies which should be more satisfactory to both the busi-
ness owner and the would-be patron.
Section 204 allows the person aggrieved to seek injunctive relief
in a United States district court against any of the various acts for-
bidden by section 203. Upon application by the complainant, the
court in its discretion may appoint an attorney for the complainant
SCivil Rights Act of 1964, § 201 (e), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000a(e) (1964).
Whether a trailer park would be a place of lodging for transients does not seem to
have been considered by Congress. BNA, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964).
' Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Bouje v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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and allow commencement of the civil action without payment of fees,
costs or security. Also in its discretion, the court may allow the pre-
vailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs. The Attorney General may not initiate an action
at a single, isolated act of discrimination, but he may, in the discre-
tion of the court, intervene in such an action brought by a private
person if he (the Attorney General) certifies that the case is "of
general public importance. ' The act has been interpreted to em-
power the Attorney General to request a hearing by a three-judge
district court in any case in which he intervenes." The United States,
if it is a losing party, is liable for costs the same as a private person.
The Attorney General may initiate an action when he "has reason-
able cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged
in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any
of the rights"" secured by the title. This provision has not yet been
utilized, but it would seem to authorize the Attorney General to bring
an action if he can show repeated violations by one person or
single violations by a number of people in an area." After filing such
a complaint, the Attorney General is expressly empowered to request,
after certifying that the case is of general public importance, that a
three-judge court be convened. A direct appeal may be taken to
the Supreme Court."
Further evidence of the importance which Congress attached to
civil rights litigation is shown by requirements which seem to give
such cases priority in the federal judiciary. When the Attorney
General certifies that a case is of public importance, section 206 directs
that the clerk of the court receiving it shall "immediately" furnish
a copy of the certificate to the presiding judge of the circuit, who
shall "designate immediately" three judges to hear the case. The
judges to whom such a case is assigned, either singly or as: a three-
' 4 2 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3 (a) (1964). In explaining this phrase on the Senate floor, then-
Senator Hubert Humphrey said: "(W)here the Attorney General believes that a suit
brought by an individual under Title II is important-because, for example, the points
of law involved in it are of major significance or because the particular decision will con-
stitute a precedent for a large number of establishments-he may request intervention in
order to present the Government's point of view .. " 110 Cong. Rec. 12286-87 (1963).
"Willis v. Pickrick, 231 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
"Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 206(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-5(a) (1964).
" In explaining this section, Senator Humphrey said: "It is expected that this power
of the Attorney General will be an important aid to maintaining public order in cases in
which repeated discrimination in public accommodations has given rise to demonstrations
and public violence. Since these are among the most explosive and disruptive instances of
discrimination, we felt that the Attorney General had to have power to act quickly and
decisively in the interest of public peace and harmony." 110 Cong. Rec. 12286-87 (1963).
In explaining this and a number of other Senate revisions to the House bill, the senator
did not explain how much territory was envisioned by the word "area."
"Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 206(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-5(b) (1964).
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judge court, have the duty "to assign the case for hearing at the
earliest practicable date, . . . and to cause the case to be in every
way expedited." 4 That the federal courts have taken these require-
ments seriously is shown by decisions in the first two cases rendered
less than three weeks after the act went into effect.5
Counterbalancing the provision for swift federal court action is
section 204 (c) and (d), which will forestall resort to federal courts
where possible. If the act takes place in a state which has a state or
local law prohibiting such discrimination, no action can be brought
under the federal act until thirty days after notice has been given
to the appropriate state or local authority. After thirty days the
federal court may proceed or may stay its action if local enforcement
proceedings are under way.
Language of the section apparently requires that the state law be
one which prohibits the same act as the one for which federal relief
is sought, but not that the state remedy be equivalent.'" This section
should be read in conjunction with section 207(a) which makes
clear that federal jurisdiction is not contingent upon "whether the
aggrieved party shall have exhausted any . . . other remedies that
may be provided by law." The purpose, according to a sponsor of
the act, was to "give to State and local officials . . . opportunity to
achieve voluntary compliance without Federal action." 7
If the act takes place in a state in which there is no state or local
anti-discrimination law, the federal court may refer the matter to
the Community Relations Service if the court believes voluntary com-
pliance may be obtained in this way. If at the end of sixty days the
Service has not resolved the dispute, the court may allow another
sixty days, but no more. s
The Community Relations Service was established by Title X of
the Act"s and was given the responsibility of bringing about peaceful,
private resolution of civil rights difficulties wherever possible. The
Service consists of a director, appointed for a four-year term, plus
necessary civil service personnel. Conciliation efforts are to be con-
14 Ibid.
"5 Willis v. Pickrick, 231 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ga. 1964), and Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ga. 1964) were decided July 22, 1964. The
Civil Rights Act was signed by the President July 2, 1964.
" State laws traditionally have treated discrimination as a misdemeanor and/or have
awarded damages to the person discriminated against. See, e.g., Calif. Civ. Code §5 51-54;
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 55 25-1-1 to 25-2-5 (1963); Neb. Rev. Stat. §5 20-101 to 20-102
(1962).
"Remarks of Senator Humphrey at 110 Cong. Rec. 11286-87 (1963). It was further
contended that "experience in States that have public accommodations laws is that most
complaints can be settled by voluntary procedures." Ibid.
"SCivil Rights Act of 1964, 5 204(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3 (a) (1964).
"
9 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 55 1001-4, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2 000g- 2 000g-3 (1964).
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ducted without publicity, and all information obtained is to be held
in confidence on penalty of a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment
up to one year."
Finally, enforcement of the public accommodations title is subject
to the contempt provisions of Title XI." This title puts special re-
strictions on criminal contempt proceedings in cases arising out of all
the titles to the Civil Rights Act except Title I, the one relating to
voting rights." The restrictions require that criminal contempt actions
be tried to a jury, that intent to violate the act be shown and that
penalties not exceed a $1,000 fine or six months imprisonment. A
defendant can be put in jeopardy only once for the same act or
omission.
However, Title XI makes clear that the act does not impair the
traditional powers of a federal court sitting in equity to use civil
contempt as a coercive weapon. Section 1101 says: "Nor shall any-
thing herein be construed to deprive courts of their power, by civil
contempt proceedings, without a jury, to secure compliance with or
to prevent obstruction of, as distinguished from punishment for
violations of, any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or com-
mand of the court in accordance with the prevailing usages of law
and equity, including the power of detention.""4
The difference between civil and criminal contempt has been the
subject of frequent confusion. It is discussed at length in United
States v. United Mine Workers," in which the distinction is made
that civil contempt is a conditional sanction which gives the de-
fendant a choice of obeying the order in the future or accepting the
punishment, while criminal contempt is an unconditional punishment
for past disobedience. From this it would seem that the label used by
the court would make a vast difference to the defendant in the strin-
gency of the action the court could take against him.
Taken as a whole, the Civil Rights Act assembles for the person
who can show he has suffered a discrimination within the scope of
the act a powerful arsenal of legal weapons. He has an action not
only against the person who discriminates, but against anyone who
attempts to interfere with his efforts to enforce his rights. If he is
unable to employ an attorney, the court may appoint one for him,
and the action may be instituted without payment of fees, costs or
' 
5 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1003(b), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000g-2(b) (1964).
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 1101-6, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000h-2000h-6 (1964).
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000h (1964).
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1102, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000h-I (1964).
24Civl Rights Act of 1964, § 1101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000h (1964). (Emphasis added.)
2330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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security. If he wins, the losing party pays all expenses, including, if
the court approves, attorney's fee. Most important, if the com-
plaintant wins, his adversary will be subject to a federal court in-
junction, one of the most potent civil sanctions available in this
country.
Balancing these are some substantial protections for the potential
defendant, aside from the special safeguards for criminal contempt
proceedings. The businessman is not required to act at his peril; no
injunction can be issued until there has been a judicial determination
that the act applies to his business."6 Nor can there be any penalty
unless an injunction is disobeyed. If he prevails in the action, the
business owner, too, can recover costs and, in the discretion of the
court, his attorney's fee.
In sum, Congress plainly wrote the act to provide swift resolution
of the long and often violent controversy over who can enter a place
generally open to the public. Determining what places are "public"
is the only real issue left. This will be explored from the viewpoint
of (1) how far the act could be extended within the constitutional
scope of Congressional power, and (2) how far Congress intended
the act to extend.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes."" The last clause of section 8 confers power
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers. . . ." s Taken together, the two
clauses can be construed to reach almost anything-or almost nothing.
In 176 years both approaches have been tried.
Two objections were urged by opponents of the Civil Rights Act
as making it beyond the scope of the commerce clause: (1) that the
activities which it regulates are essentially local, and (2) that the real
reason for enacting the regulation was not to protect commerce but
to enlarge the rights of certain groups. 9 An honest advocate of the
" The only provision for enforcement is for either the person against whom discrimi-
nation is practiced or, in appropriate situations, the Attorney General to ask a federal
district court for a "permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order
. .. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 204(a), 205(a), 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000a-3 (a) (1964).
Title XI provides for the traditional powers of a court of equity to enforce injunctions,
with the aforementioned exceptions in cases of criminal contempt.
27U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2s U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
" For an interpretation of the act, holding it unconstitutional, see McClung v. Katzen-
bach, 233 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
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law could hardly deny the literal truth of both statements.'" But the
difficulty which besets objectors is that the cases construing the com-
merce power long ago passed the point of no return on both issues.
The Supreme Court time and again has upheld regulations under the
commerce clause even though the regulated activity (if only one
isolated unit of that activity is considered) is admittedly local. Regu-
lation under the commerce clause with a non-commercial purpose is
similarly commonplace today.
How words so few and simple have come to confer such extensive
power can be understood only in light of the historical development
of the commerce clause. Collectively, the commerce clause cases
reflect not only the evolution of the United States economy but also
the changing philosophies of the proper relation of the federal gov-
ernment to it.
The development began in 1824 with Gibbons v. Ogden."5 A colli-
sion of state and national interests had been triggered by the invention
of the steamboat, first of many technological advances which have
assaulted the barriers behind which states supposedly conduct their
internal affairs unmolested. As a reward for their efforts, inventors
Fulton and Livingston had been granted an exclusive right to operate
steamboats in New York waters. Ogden was licensed by them to
operate a steam ferry on the Hudson River between New York and
New Jersey. Gibbons, who was licensed by act of Congress to engage
in the "coasting" trade, challenged New York's right to exclude
him from the Hudson. New York state courts held that Congress
could not regulate traffic which was confined entirely to New York
rivers within the interior of the state.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion which held that the
right granted by Congress prevailed over that granted by New York.
The opinion is important primarily because of the thoroughness with
which the federal commerce power was defined. As a contemporary
and political associate of the Constitution's framers and a leader at the
Virginia ratifying convention, the great Chief Justice sometimes
seemed to speak on constitutional questions with the thundering
authority of Moses come down from the mountaintop. Nor did he
hesitate to do so.
In Mr. Justice Marshall's view, the New York steamer business,
though wholly within that state, was part of a larger whole, national
in scope. He said that "commerce, as the word is used in the "Con-
" Congress was asked to pass the act "to make a commitment it has not fully made
in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life or law." Address
by the late President John F. Kennedy on radio and television, June 11, 1963.
316 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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stitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by the term."3
Commerce among the states could not be restricted to acts which in
themselves involved the crossing of a state line. "Commerce among
the states cannot stop at the external boundary of each state but may
be introduced into the interior."' Using a phrase often relied upon
since, he said commerce "among" means "commerce which concerns
more states than one.""
Mr. Justice Marshall puts limits, also often relied upon, on the
scope of commerce among the states. "It is not intended that these
words comprehend that commerce which is completely internal,
which is carried on between man and man in a state, or between
different parts of the same state, and which does not extend to or
affect other states .... The completely internal commerce of a state,
then, may be considered as reserved for the state itself."'"
Thus, Gibbons v. Ogden, like Scripture, has been used to support
highly diverse viewpoints." It is cited both in the most restrictive and
the most expansive of later opinions. Suppose, for example, a chain
of events in which a commodity goes from (1) producer to (2)
processor to (3) wholesaler to (4) retailer to (5) consumer. The
production is done wholly in Texas, the processing wholly in Massa-
chusetts, and the wholesaler, retailer and consumer are all in Missouri.
What part of this chain, if any, is commerce among the states? The
restrictive view, with massive support in pre-1937 Supreme Court
opinions, is that none of the enumerated activities as such is interstate
commerce. Only the transfers from Texas to Massachusetts and from
Massachusetts to Missouri are interstate commerce. The production in
Texas and the processing in Massachusetts, as well as the transfers
between the wholesaler, retailer and consumer in Missouri are, in this
rationale, activities described by Mr. Justice Marshall as "completely
internal, carried on between man and man in a state." The Supreme
Court's post-1937 view has emphasized the Marshall definition of
commerce as a "unit, every part of which is indicated by the term,"
and has held all five activities to be interstate commerce. With this
approach, the production in Texas, for example, would not be "com-
pletely internal" because it does not qualify under the rest of the
2 Id. at 7. (Emphasis added.)
" Ibid.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
"Id. at 7-8. (Emphasis added.)
It is scarcely believable that as staunch a champion of national power as Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall would have accepted some of the late nineteenth century opinions which
purported to rely on Gibbons v. Ogden. For example, the Court in United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), held the commerce power inadequate to break up a
coast-to-coast monopoly in sugar refining because it regarded each individual refinery in
the combine as a local operation.
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definition as an activity "which does not extend to or affect other
states."
At present Congress regulates a host of operations carried on wholly
within one state because they are found to "affect" other states. How
far the outer definitional limit of "commerce," as the word is used
in the Constitution, can go in regulating matters within the states is
a question on which reasonable men have differed and probably will
continue to differ.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Mr. Justice Marshall not only considered the
proper objects of the commerce power, but the manner in which
the power could be exercised. Here the power, once it is determined
that the object of regulation is commerce among the states, is
"plenary":
To regulate is to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be gov-
erned. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution. . . . The
wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people,
and the influence which their constituents possess at election, are, in
this, as in many other instances .... the sole restraints on which they
have relied, to secure them from its abuse."
In brief, the Chief Justice seems to say that, once it has been de-
termined that an activity is "commerce among the states," Congress
is limited in the way it regulates that commerce only by a regard
for the upcoming elections. This viewpoint has not always been
accepted by later Courts, but has been followed in recent years in
upholding regulations for noncommercial ends." Most litigation, how-
ever, has centered on whether a particular activity was a proper object
of the power-i.e., whether it was "completely internal" or "among
the states."
Between Gibbons v. Odgen in 1824 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp." in 1937, two disparate philosophies can be seen at work
in the commerce decisions. One line of cases was based on language
in Gibbons that the "completely internal commerce" of a state is
reserved for state regulation. Another line of cases tended more
toward defining interstate commerce as "commerce which concerns
more states than one," despite containment of the regulated activity
within one state.
Most of the nineteenth century cases dealt not with how far into
the interior affairs of a state the Congress might exend its regulation
31 Id. at 9
as E.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
3"301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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of commerce, but with how far the states might go in exercising their
powers on commercial activities having an impact beyond the state. °
The Court announced early that matters concededly within the federal
power might appropriately be regulated by the states. Cooley v. Board
of Wardens" established a test based upon whether the commerce in
question required uniform, national regulation or varying rules in
different parts of the country. If the former, Congress alone could
legislate; if the latter, the states might act.
Cooley had the virtue of flexibility, the vice of uncertainty. Beset
as it was by a flood of state laws necessary-or ostensibly necessary-
to protect the welfare of local citizens, the Court on occasion tried
to develop more precise formulae. Mr. Justice Marshall's description
of "completely internal" in Gibbons and of the "original package"
in Brown v. Maryland" were relied on in many cases to determine the
point when commerce becomes subject to state power. Inevitably,
tests developed to determine if acts were within the reach of the
states were transferred into federal cases and treated as holding by
negative inference that such activities were not within the scope of
national power.
A. The Restrictive View
In Kidd v. Pearson," the Court held in 18 8 8 that the state of Iowa
could prohibit manufacture of liquor in Iowa for sale outside of the
state. The manufacture, it was reasoned, was not commerce. "The
buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto con-
stitute commerce . ,,"" Seven years later the same reasoning was
applied in United States v. E. C. Knight Co.," a federal case. Knight
held that the United States could not use the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act to break up a monopoly in the manufacture of sugar. That the
manufacturing combine was able to control almost the entire sugar
market made no difference. Manufacturing, even the manufacturing
of goods to be sold interstate, was a local activity subject only to local
control. Interstate commerce did not begin, in the Court's view at
that time, until the product was transported across state lines. Plainly,
this was a contraction of Mr. Justice Marshall's view of "commerce
among the states" as "commerce which concerns more states than one."
'0 See, e.g., Passenger Cases, 17 U.S. (7 How.) 123 (1848); License Cases, 16 U.S. (5
How.) 513 (1846).
4153 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
427 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 262 (1827).
' See 1 Schwartz, The Powers of Government 185 (1963).
44128 U.S. 1 (1888).
43 Id. at 20.
4e 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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The Knight view, which chopped off from the definition of inter-
state commerce those activities which occur before and after inter-
state transport, was subsequently extended to agriculture," mining48
and oil production." This restricted view, though modified in con-
struing subsequent anti-trust cases,"° provided the authority by which
the Court forty years later invalidated the legislation of the First
New Deal. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States' the Court
cited Kidd v. Pearson," the decision underlying Knight, in denying
federal power to regulate New York poultry slaughterhouses handling
chickens shipped in from other states for sale in New York. By this
time the commerce clause had been extended to intrastate operations
which "directly" affected interstate commerce." But in Schechter the
Court relied on geographic factors to find that the poultry houses
were too remote from interstate commerce to "affect" it in constitu-
tional terms. It emphasized that "the flow in interstate commerce
had ceased" and that the poultry "had come to a permanent rest
within the State.,
54
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R.55 is illustrative of a line
of cases representing the undoubted high water mark in strict con-
struction of the commerce clause. The Court held a compulsory pen-
sion plan for railroad employees void because it was not "necessary"
to the regulation of commerce. The same basic approach was evident
in Hammer v. Dagenhart5" in 1918, in which the court held that a law
banning shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced by child
labor was beyond the constitutional powers of Congress. It was con-
ceded that the law was a regulation of commerce among the states;
the objection was that it was not intended as such. The Court found
that the real purpose was to regulate conditions under which the
" United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
4 Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
49 Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1923).
50 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 167, v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934); Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
s'295 U.S. 495 (1935).
'2 Id. at 547. See also Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1 888).
"SSee cases cited in discussion in Schechter Corp v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
544-49 (1935).
54295 U.S. at 543. The same philosophy underlaid other decisions of the early thirties.
See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (which invalidated a scheme
for regulating prices, wages and hours in coal mining); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1 (1936) (which struck down the first Agricultural Adjustment Act because regulation of
farming "invades the reserved powers of the states").
55295 U.S. 330 (1935).
"6247 U.S. 251 (1918). In a similar vein is an earlier case, Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908), which held unconstitutional a law prohibiting the use of "yellow
dog" contracts for employees of interstate railroads. It was aimed at employment contracts
which require that the employee agree not to join a labor union.
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goods were manufactured. Relying on prior cases" defining manufac-
ture as a local activity within state control, the state held that the act
invaded the reserved powers of the states. Today, Hammer v. Dagen-
hart is remembered chiefly for Mr. Justice Homes' dissent. 8 "I should
have thought that the most conspicuous decisions of this Court," he
said, "had made it clear that the power to regulate commerce and
other constitutional powers could not be cut down or qualified by
the fact that it might interfere with the carrying out of the domestic
policy of any State." 9
Hammer v. Dagenhart might be regarded as that view of the com-
merce clause which extends it to "almost nothing." In the Hammer
view, it is not sufficient that the operative reach of the statute be
confined to interstate commerce. The statute is invalid if its con-
sequent effects regulate local activities. On its face, it is a standard
almost impossible to achieve. Hardly ever will an interstate regula-
tion fail to have repercussions reaching into local affairs.
Underlying the Knight-Hammer-Schechter cases was a concern as
old as the republic, that the balance of power between federal and
state governments might be upset to the detriment of the states. In
Knight the Court declared: "Slight reflection will show that if the
national power extends to all contracts and combinations in manu-
facture, agriculture, mining, and other productive industries, whose
ultimate result may affect external commerce, comparatively little of
business operations and affairs would be left for state control."'0 This
language is echoed in Schechter in which it was said: "If the com-
merce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions
which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate com-
merce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activi-
ties of the people and the authority of the state over its domestic
concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal government."6
This belief that a liberal construction of the commerce and "neces-
sary and proper" clauses opens the floodgate for extension of federal
power to the most minute detail of local activity is still a subject of
debate, not limited only to the courts. The argument is often made
that opening this floodgate makes-or has made-without benefit of
a constitutional convention, a fundamental change in the federal-state
system as envisioned by the founding fathers.
" E.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
50247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918).
9 Id. at 278.
"0United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
" Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (193 5).
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B. The Expansive View
The fundamental change, if such there has been, began and de-
veloped simultaneously with the flowering of the Knight-Hammer-
Schechter doctrine."2 Its beginnings are most easily traced from the
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act" and the myriad railroad
cases that followed. Actually, there probably were at least three lines
of cases which expanded the commerce power in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century. They include (1) the railroad cases, (2)
the "current of commerce" cases, and (3) the police-type regulation
cases.
1. The Railroad Cases Passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in
1887 resulted, as has often been the case with commerce clause de-
velopments, from the impact of technology on the nation's economy.
When the golden spike was driven in Utah in 1869 to complete the
spanning of the continent with rails, the stage was already set for an
affirmative assertion of the long-dormant national power over com-
merce. By the 1850's the railroads had become the dominant method
of transportation. As older, competing methods were squeezed out,
the railway corporations themselves began to combine and form
monopolies.
A community served by a single railroad became utterly dependent
on that railroad for its economic well-being. In time there were
many such communities whose inhabitants complained bitterly to
their congressmen of railroad abuses of power through rebates and
discriminatory rates, and of the ineffectiveness of local regulation to
combat these practices. The railroads-vast, vital, undeniably inter-
state and, above all, enormously powerful-plainly met the Cooley"
requirement of subject matter imperatively calling for national
regulation.
The installation of the Interstate Commerce Commission to see
that rates were "just and reasonable" was the beginning of a long
and often stormy relationship between the federal government and
American railroads. Those who deplore the present expanse of federal
regulation might justifiably cite the Interstate Commerce Act as the
means by which the camel got his nose under the tent, for it was
the leading edge of laws and decisions which eventually thrust federal
standards deep into local affairs.
In 1893, just six years after rate regulation was enacted, Congress
62 See 1 Schwartz, The Powers of Government 189 (1963).
6324 Stat. 379 (1887). as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-1542 (1958).
64 See note 41 supra, and accompanying text.
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passed the Railroad Safety Appliance Act."' In 1903 the act was
amended in an apparent effort to make clear that the safety require-
ments were to apply to all vehicles used by a railroad engaged in inter-
state commerce. 6 In 1911, in Southern Ry v. United States," the
Court was faced with the question whether Congress could require a
railroad operating interstate to use the safety devices on vehicles
making intrastate runs. The Court answered "yes" with no apparent
qualms as to whether the regulation of intrastate matter invaded the
reserved powers of the state over local undertakings.
Without discussion, the Court found the object of the law, protec-
tion of the safety of those employed in moving interstate commerce,
to be within the constitutional authority of Congress. Because of the
commingling of interstate and intrastate traffic, with both classes of
traffic at times being carried in the same car, the Court found it was
necessary to regulate intrastate traffic in order to make effective the
protection of interstate commerce. Groundwork for this decision had
been laid in 1871 in The Daniel Ball,"6 in which the Court held that
a steamer operating intrastate was subject to congressional power
because it carried goods on one leg of an interstate journey. As in the
safety appliance case, the intrastate vessel had become "commingled"
with the interstate flow.
This reasoning was carried a step further in 1914 in the famous
Shreveport Rate Case." The problem was that the rate set by the
Texas Railroad Commission for intrastate runs to Dallas and Houston
was substantially lower than the rate set by the Interstate Commerce
Commission for a trip of about the same distance from the same
East Texas area to Shreveport, Louisiana. The ICC ordered the intra-
state rates raised, and its order was sustained by the Supreme Court.
Where intrastate commerce competes with interstate commerce, the
Court held the national government might impose such regulation
of intrastate rates as was appropriate to the regulation of interstate
commerce and necessary to its efficiency. Thus, competing intrastate
commerce was put on the same footing as commingled intrastate
commerce.
The Shreveport rule was reaffirmed in 1922 in a case growing out
of the Transportation Act of 1920, ° which prescribed the procedure
for returning the railroads to private ownership after World War I.
The act empowered the ICC to set rates to enable the railroads to earn
6527 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1958).
"32 Stat. 943 (1903), 45 U.S.C. § 8-10 (1958).
67222 U.S. 20 (1911).
6677 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
6 9 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
7 41 Stat. 456 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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a "fair return" on their value and, for the first time, directly author-
ized the Commission to deal with intrastate rates which discriminated
to the detriment of interstate commerce. Since the "fair return" pro-
vided for in the act was for the carriers' property taken as a whole,
low intrastate rates would have had to be offset by correspondingly
high rates for interstate traffic. The Wisconsin Railroad Commission
set low intrastate rates, and the ICC ordered them increased to the
fares set for interstate traffic. In Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, Burl-
ington &q Quincy R.R.,' the Court upheld the ICC, saying, "Effective
control of one [interstate commerce] must embrace some control
over the other [intrastate commerce], in view of the blending of both
in actual operation."7 Shreveport, the Court made clear, was not a
momentary aberration.
The first Federal Employers' Liability Act' had a harder time in
the courts than the Safety Appliance Act which preceded it, although
both were aimed at improving the lot of railroad employees. The
first FELA was held invalid in 1908 because it apparently extended
to the injuries of railroad employees engaged in intrastate commerce. '
A second statute passed in 1910 was explicitly limited to injuries
suffered by employees while engaged in interstate, foreign or terri-
torial commerce." Thirty years and many decisions later the second
(1910) statute was amended to extend FELA protection to employees
whose duties "affect" interstate commerce. "
Two other early twentieth century statutes should be mentioned
as part of the push given by railroad regulations to extend federal
commerce powers. The Railway Labor Act of 1926" set out pro-
cedures for settling disputes between employers and employees,
serving as a model for the National Labor Relations Act"8 nine years
later. The Adamson Act of 1916"9 regulated wages and decreed an
eight-hour day for employees engaged in the operation of interstate
carriers. In a five-to-four decision, the Court in Wilson v. New"0
held in 1917 that this wage and hour regulation was necessary and
proper for carrying out the regulation of commerce. Eighteen years
7'257 U.S. 563 (1922).
7 Id. at 588.
"
3 Ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906).7
'
4 Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
7'36 Stat. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958), upheld in Mondue v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
7653 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 (1958).
7744 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (1958).
7849 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
7139 Stat. 721 (1916), 45 U.S.C. §§ 65-66 (1958).
80243 U.S. 332 (1917).
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later in Alton" the ground had shifted a bit, and a pension plan was
found not to be necessary.
2. The "Current of Commerce" Cases The second liberalizing force
at work on the limits of the commerce clause in the early twentieth
century is seen in the "current of commerce" cases. The first of these
was Swift & Co. v. United States12 in 1905. At issue was whether the
Sherman Act,"3 which prohibited a restraint of trade in interstate
commerce, applied to sales of cattle in Midwestern stockyards. The
cattle were shipped in from the West to the stockyards and there
sold by local commission men to dealers or packers, who then usually
moved them out for future sales as fresh meat in other states. In
holding that the Sherman Act applied, Mr. Justice Holmes declared:
[C]ommerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but
a practical one, drawn from the course of business. When cattle are
sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that they
will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect
they do so, with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser in
the stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course,
the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the states,
and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such com-
merce."
The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 " was upheld in Stafford v.
Wallace8 by the application of the same reasoning to similar facts.
In Stafford, Mr. Chief Justice Taft refused to look on the sale at the
stockyards as a mere local transaction to be considered apart from
the well-understood west-to-east flow. "The stockyards," he said,
"are but a throat through which the current flows, and the trans-
actions which occur therein are only incident to this current from
the West to the East . ,,." A year later in 1923, Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. Olsen88 used the "current of commerce" doctrine to uphold
the Grain Futures Act."
3. Police-type Regulation Cases The third line of cases expanding
the commerce clause in the early twentieth century were those in
which the power over commerce was used with noncommercial mo-
tives. Unquestionably the leading case is Caminetti v. United States,"'
81 See note 55 supra, and accompanying text.
82 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
8826 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1958).
84 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905).
8542 Stat. 159 (1921), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1958).
'6258 U.S. 495 (1922).
87258 U.S. at 516.
88262 U.S. 1 (1923).
8942 Stat. 998 (1922), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 5 1-17 (1958) (now known as the
Commodity Exchange Act).
90242 U.S. 470 (1917).
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which construed the Mann Act."1 The act was designed as a weapon
against white slave traffic, but the Court held that it could be applied
in a situation in which an "immoral purpose," but no "prostitution
for hire," was shown. "[T]he authority of Congress to keep the
channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious
uses... is no longer open to question."92 Relying on Hoke v. United
States,"3 the Court declared that the power of Congress over com-
merce is "complete in itself."9 As an incident to it, Congress "may
adopt not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and
the means may have the quality of police regulations.""2
The Lottery Case" upheld in 1903 an act forbidding the trans-
port of lottery tickets in interstate commerce. It was the first of a
host of laws having "the quality of police regulations" which were
enacted under the commerce power. Among others were acts aimed
at the transport of stolen cars, 7 impure food and drugs,99 stolen
goods,99 kidnapped persons,"' fraudulent securities,' fugitive felons
and witnesses.'
In the midst of these patently noncommercial acts aimed at sub-
jects generally regarded as within state power came Hammer v.
Dagenhart."a Here the Court refused to allow a ban on the shipment
of goods made by child labor. Previous "police regulations," such as
the Lottery Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act, were distinguished
on the ground that in Hammer the evil at which the law was aimed
was ended and the goods themselves were harmless by the time they
reached the stream of commerce.1" Mr. Justice Holmes did not find
this distinction persuasive." s Hammer underlines the existence in the
commerce cases of two forces set on a collision course.
91 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (1958).
92242 U.S. at 491.
" 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
" Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 492 (1917), quoting from Hoke v. United
States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913).
" Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
"Champion v. Ames 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
"7National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-13 (1958), upheld in Brooks
v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
"SFederal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), upheld in
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
"National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1958), applied in United States v.
Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379 (1946).
"°°Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1958), applied in Gooch v. United
States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
... Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1958), applied
in Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1935).
102 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1958), upheld in Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947).
101247 U.S. 251 (1918).
'
9 4Id. at 271.
o Id. at 277. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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C. The Return To Gibbons v. Ogden
Commerce cases since 1937, beginning with the historic decision
of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,' are a distinct body of
law. Seldom is such a sharp cut-off seen as in pre- and post-1937
commerce law. Between 1937 and 1942, the authority of the Knight-
Hammer-Schechter line of cases was completely destroyed. Hammer
was explicitly overruled in United States v. Darby."°' Knight and
Schechter, though never overruled, were effectively obliterated by
Jones &. Laughlin and Wickard v. Filburn."'0
How did such a change come about? Many explanations have been
offered, often tied in with the 1936 election results and a court-
packing plan submitted to Congress in 1937. Certainly it was evident
by late 1936 that the New Deal, despite one catastrophic setback
after another in the Supreme Court, was a spectacular success at the
polls.
Another explanation might be that the expansive forces at work
for some thirty years in the railroad, "current of commerce" and
police regulation cases finally won out. It can not be said that Shreve-
port, Swift &q Co. and Caminetti made Jones & Laughlin inevitable,
but they clearly laid the foundation. From Marshall's day forward
the broad construction doctrine had never been entirely without
champions. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in the Knight case,09 and
Mr. Justice Holmes in Hammer." ' In Schechter, Mr. Justice Cardozo
concurred, but put more emphasis on the invalid delegation of power
than on remoteness from interstate commerce." In Carter, decided
a year later with the same restrictive approach as Schechter, Mr.
Justice Cardozo dissented, asserting that "the [commerce] power
is as broad as the need that evokes it. ' ' ..
Jones & Laughlin upheld the National Labor Relations Act, in
which Congress declared its intention to remove the obstruction to
interstate commerce caused by labor disputes. The chosen means was
the prohibition of unfair labor practices "affecting commerce.... The
defendant steel company relied on seemingly ample prior authority
in challenging the law. It cited, among others, Schechter," Carter,'
106301 U.S. 1 (1937).
107 312 U.S. 100, 117 (1941).
10:317 U.S. 111 (1942).
10 United States v. E. C. Knight & Co., 156 U.S. 1, 18 (1895).
1.Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918).
"' Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
... Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 328 (1936).
"a 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158 (1947) (Emphasis added.)
11 4Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
... Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord" and Kidd v. Pearson."' It con-
tended that the act could not be used constitutionally to regulate
its relationship with its employees in its iron and steel works at
Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, because (1) this plant was engaged in pro-
duction, a local activity not subject to the federal power and (2)
the law was not in reality a regulation of interstate commerce but
a regulation of labor relations that invaded the reserved power of the
states."' Eleven months earlier such an assault had been practically a
certain method for overturning acts of Congress.
In Laughlin, the Court began by taking note of the immensity
of the company's widespread operations. It owned iron mines in
Michigan and Minnesota, and coal mines in Pennsylvania. Ore and
coal were sent via the Great Lakes to the Pennsylvania mill where
they were made into steel and shipped out on the company's railroads
to warehouses scattered throughout the country. The Labor Board
had found that the Aliquippa works were like a "heart," drawing
in raw material from the mining states and pumping out steel to all
parts of the nation. It was an obvious analogy to Mr. Chief Justice
Taft's description of the stockyards as a "throat" through which the
current of commerce in cattle flowed.
The Court accepted this analogy and relied on the current of
commerce cases by name. It did not stop there, however, but went
on to declare that the commerce power extended further than just to
things definitely "in" interstate commerce. It relied on the railroad
cases which had extended the power to intrastate commerce. "That
power is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce
no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it.""
Jones FJ Laughlin, a five to four decision, distinguished Schechter,
leaving it almost intact. In Schechter, the Court had said that a local
activity could be regulated as an incident to the regulation of inter-
state commerce only if the local activity had a direct effect on com-
merce. The effect of the operations of the New York poultry houses
had been found to be too indirect for this purpose. In dealing with
the Jones & Laughlin Corporation, an industrial giant, there was no
such problem. The Court said, "In view of respondent's far-flung
activities, it is idle to say that the effect [of a labor dispute] would
be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be immediate and...
catastrophic.""'
110262 U.S. 172 (1923).
17 128 U.S. 1 (1888).





During the four years following Jones & Laughlin the Court up-
held application of the National Labor Relations Act to several in-
dustries smaller than the mammoth steel company. Then in 1941, in
United States v. Darby,"1 the Court squarely faced and disposed of
lingering questions posed by Knight-Hammer-Schechter. The respond-
ent was a Georgia lumber mill which operated with the admitted
intent of placing its product in interstate commerce. The respondent's
business was regulated by the Fair Labor Standards Act1 ' in two ways.
First, the act prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of
goods produced under substandard working conditions. In this it
paralleled the child labor law invalidated in Hammer. But this act
went further and prescribed wage and hour requirements for em-
ployees "engaged in commerce or the production of goods for
commerce.""'
In Darby, the government was not able, as it had been in Jones
Laughlin, to show that the respondent's activities had a great impact
on interstate commerce. The Fair Labor Standards Act was a scarcely
disguised use of the commerce power to regulate local working con-
ditions. It could not with consistency be upheld if Hammer, which
denied use of the commerce power to control indirectly matters re-
served to the states, was retained. The Court accepted the issues in
this posture and overruled Hammer."
While Jones & Laughlin had relied on the railroad and current
of commerce cases, Darby leaned heavily on the police regulation
cases as justification for use of the commerce power for extraneous
purposes. Cases upholding Congress's power to prohibit crossing of
state lines by lottery tickets, noxious goods, kidnapped persons and
improperly labeled food and drugs were cited as authority for the
proposition that Congress may prohibit use of the channels of inter-
state commerce for any purpose it disapproves. The Hammer dis-
tinction that the evil aimed at must follow interstate shipment was
declared "abandoned."'"
The Court went on to sustain the direct regulation of production
by joining the "necessary and proper" clause with the commerce
clause. "[H]aving ...adopted the policy of excluding from inter-
state commerce all goods produced for the commerce which do not
conform to the specified labor standards, it [Congress] may choose
the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end,
1"1 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
"' 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-11 (1958).
2312 U.S. at 110.
24 Id. at 117.
"25 Id. at 116.
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even though they involve control of intrastate activities. 1" In so
ruling, the Court repeated the theme of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's
famous opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland..7 to the effect that "if
the end be legitimate," Congress may use any appropriate means to
reach it.
The Court dealt also with the problem of whether Darby's volume
of business was sufficient to have any real effect on interstate com-
merce. "It [Congress] recognized that in present day industry, compe-
tition by a small part may affect the whole and that the total effect of
the competition of many small producers may be great.'. Congress,
the Court said, had found that such enterprises as Darby's had a de-
pressing effect on commerce. By paying substandard wages, they were
able to sell their goods at low prices, thus forcing down prices and
wages for other similar firms competing in the interstate market.
Darby's cumulative standard for measuring effect on commerce
was carried to its logical extreme a year later in Wickard v. Filburn."'
Filburn was a farmer whose wheat quota for the year 1938 was
eleven acres. Instead, he planted twenty-three acres and fed the 239
bushels harvested from the excess acreage to animals on his farm.
He was fined forty-nine cents a bushel for raising excess wheat under
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,1" successor to the act
invalidated in United States v. Butler."' Filburn protested that his
action could not possibly "affect" interstate commerce because (1)
he never marketed the wheat, and (2) the amount raised was so
small.
Filburn's first line of defense was that the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act sought to regulate production and consumption, though
the government disclaimed any motive except to regulate interstate
marketing of farm products. The Court treated all such distinctions
as immaterial. The criterion was not whether a thing is local or
interstate, production or marketing, but whether the activity sought
to be regulated has "a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce.
, 132
In sustaining the Agricultural Adjustment Act, Mr. Justice Jack-
son's opinion progressed step by step. The purpose of the regulation
was to prevent a glut of the interstate wheat market. To do this
effectively, Congress found it necessary to control not only supply
"'Id. at 121.
1"117 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).
12' 312 U.S. at 123. (Emphasis added.)
129317 U.S. 111 (1942).
13052 Stat. 31 (1938), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1958).
'297 U.S. 1 (1936).
"2 317 U.S. at 125. (Emphasis added.)
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but also demand. By producing and feeding to his animals 239 extra
bushels of wheat, Filburn reduced the demand on the interstate
market by that much. Hence, Congress could prohibit Filburn's
demand-reducing act.
An analogy was drawn to the Shreveport Rate Case,"a in which
the regulation of intrastate rates was permitted because they com-
peted with interstate rates. Justice Jackson said, "[I]f we assume
that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it
which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market.
Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in com-
merce."'"
Filburn's second and seemingly strongest objection, i.e., that his
effect on the market, if any, was trivial, was disposed of by applica-
tion of the cumulative effect rule. "[H]is contribution, taken to-
gether with that of many others similarly situated" was held to be
"far from trivial." '135
If Hammer represented the proposition that the commerce clause,
strictly interpreted, applies to "almost nothing," Wickard v. Filburn
as surely stands for the thesis that, liberally interpreted, the clause
reaches "almost everything." Predictably, Wickard has been relent-
lessly criticized, and nearly a quarter century later it is still a highly
controversial case. Dean Griswold, though not critical of the decision,
characterized Wickard as "very close to the borderline."' Be that
as it may, the Wickard doctrine is firmly entrenched in constitutional
law. The High Court has shown no inclination to abandon or modify
it, and the opinion has been cited again and again in subsequent
cases, including the decisions upholding the Civil Rights Act of
1964.'57
If they have done anything, the cases decided since 1942 have
expanded the application of Laughlin, Darby and Wickard. After
Darby, the Fair Labor Standards Act was applied to a multitude of
occupations on the ground that they were "necessary to the pro-
duction" of goods for interstate commerce. Among these were the em-
ployees of such independent contractors as an electrician;... a window
lsHouston, E. &. W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
" 317 U.S. at 138. (Emphasis added.)
13 Ibid.
'36 Erwn N. Griswold, Dean, Harvard University Law School, as reported in Hearings on
H.R. 7152 Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 26, pt. 1,
at 776 (1963), hereafter cited as Senate Commerce Committee Hearings.
13 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 295 (1964).
1' Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657 (1946).
1965 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
cleaning firm;139 and an architectural firm," ° the greater part of whose
work was done for an industrial plant producing goods for com-
merce. In Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 14 the wage and hour
law was applied to a newspaper whose circulation was about 9,000
copies, of which only forty-five copies-about one-half of one per
cent of its total volume-were mailed out of state.
The National Labor Relations Act similarly has been extended to
reach enterprises having much less effect on commerce than Jones &
Laughlin Co. In Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.," the act was
applied to an Akron, Ohio, retailer even though all its sales were
intrastate and only slightly more than $100,000 of its annual pur-
chases of almost $900,000 came from outside Ohio. If proof were
needed that Schechter, although never overruled, is dead, Fairlawn
supplied it. The new approach was summarized in United States v.
Women's Sportswear Ass'n: "If it is interstate commerce that feels
the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies
the squeeze."'' As recently as 1963, in NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil
Corp.," the Court upheld NLRB jurisdiction over Reliance because
a "substantial amount" of the fuel which it sold locally had, though
purchased locally, originally come from out of state.
In United States v. Sullivan,"' the Court extended the coverage
of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act' to prohibit the sale
by a retail druggist of improperly labeled tablets, even though the
tablets were obtained by the retailer locally six months earlier and
had been labeled properly while in interstate commerce.
As Sullivan and the window cleaning case indicate, the commerce
clause today allows Congress to regulate fairly remote events occur-
ring both before and after interstate shipment. And the link to inter-
state commerce, as indicated by the one-half of one per cent pro-
duction in Mabee, may be relatively tenuous so long as it is definitely
shown. The "de minimis" limitation is apparently of no help to a
business if it is one of many similar establishments over the country.
III. PREVIOUS APPLICATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE TO
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The part just completed treated the historical development of the
". Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946).
'Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughey & Associates, 358 U.S. 207 (1959).
14'327 U.S. 178 (1946).
142353 U.S. 20 (1957).
143336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
'44 371 U.S. 224 (1963).
'45 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
14' 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
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commerce clause in general. This part will deal with cases prior to
1964 in which the commerce clause was applied--or was refused
application-in race discrimination situations.
Nineteenth century cases provide little but confusion. In Hall v.
DeCuir" ' in 1878, the Court struck down a law prohibiting segre-
gation on public carriers passed by a Louisiana reconstruction legis-
lature. It was held to be a void restriction on interstate commerce.
In 1890, Louisville, N.O. &. Tex. Ry. v. Mississippi"8 upheld a
Mississippi law requiring segregation on carriers. It was not a burden
on interstate commerce, the Court said, because it only applied intra-
state. Between these two cases came the Civil Rights Cases' in 1883,
in which the Court invalidated an act very similar to the Public
Accommodations Title in the 1964 act.
The Civil Rights Cases arose out of an 1875 act"' which was
squarely based on the power Congress thought it had been granted
by the fourteenth amendment. The Court gave only brief, glancing
treatment to commerce clause aspects, but produced eighty-one years
of uncertainty whether such a law based on the commerce power
would be constitutional. The chief source of doubt was the Court's
statement that "no one will contend that the power to pass it [the
1875 Civil Rights Act] was contained in the Constitution before
the adoption of the last three amendments [thirteenth, fourteenth
and fifteenth] ..,..'
Another statement made by the Court pointed in the opposite
direction. Having held that the fourteenth amendment did not give
Congress authority to pass such a law, the Court added:
Of course, these remarks do not apply to those cases in which Congress
is clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole
subject, accompanied with an express or implied denial of such power
to the states, as in the regulation of commerce . . . among the several
states .... In these cases Congress has power to pass laws for regulating
the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct and transactions
of individuals in respect thereof."'
In the final analysis, the cases are not authority either way on
the commerce power, for the issue was stated, but not decided:
"And whether Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate
commerce amongst the several states, might or might not pass a law
regulating rights in public conveyances passing from one state to
14795 U.S. 485 (1878).
14133 U.S. 587 (1890).
14109 U.S. 3 (1883).
10 Ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
"'. 109 U.S. at 10.
1"' Id. at 18.
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another, is also a question which is not now before us, as the sections
in question are not conceived in any such view. '
The law was substantially unchanged until 1941, when the Court
first allowed use of the Interstate Commerce Act as a weapon against
segregation on interstate carriers. The act declares that "it shall be
unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this
chapter to make, give or cause any undue or unreasonable preference
or advantage to any particular person ... or to subject any particular
person ...to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage
in any respect whatsoever."'".. Designed originally to prevent rate
discrimination and rebates, the provision offered a ready-made tool
for eliminating discrimination from transportation. Similar statutes
apply to motor carriers... and air carriers.' In a series of cases,
these three statutes were applied to outlaw segregation in trains,1 17
diner cars,5s buses5 and airlines.' Because of the plenary power of
Congress over commerce, it applied equally whether the segregation
was required by state law or by regulation of the carrier."'
In Boynton v. Virginia,' nondiscrimination was required in a bus
terminal restaurant operated as an "integral part" of the carrier's
service. In Baldwin v. Morgan,' nondiscrimination was required in
waiting rooms, with the further stipulation that a Negro passenger
could not be required to prove he was making an interstate trip
before using the so-called "interstate and white" waiting room.
The limits of the usefulness of the Interstate Commerce Act in
desegregation became apparent in Williams v. Howard Johnson's
Restaurant."4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the Interstate Commerce Act applies only to com-
mon carriers and cannot be applied in the case of a highway restau-
rant. The Court also rejected the contention that the commerce
clause was self-executing and provided authority, even without a
specific statute, for removing any restriction on commerce.
".. Id. at 19.
114 Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended 49 U.S.C. § 3 (1958).
"'SMotor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1958).
"e Air Carrier Economic Regulation Act, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1374(b) (1958).
15 Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
"SHenderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
'"Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
"seFitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
"" Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1951).
102364 U.S. 454 (1960).
"6a 2 8 7 F.2d 750 '5th Cir. 1961).
164268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).
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IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
When the Public Accommodations Title was being considered by
the Senate Commerce Committee in 1963, one of the act's support-
ers urged basing the bill on the fourteenth amendment so as to
avoid "stretching the commerce clause.'. 1. Representatives of the
Justice Department, though expressing sympathy with the senator's
concern, demurred.
The problem was the decision in the Civil Rights Cases"' in 1883.
As the Justice Department pointed out, the act proposed in 1963
was, except for its commerce clause provisions, "indistinguishable"
from the act before the Court in 1883."7 But in 1883, only fifteen
years after the fourteenth amendment was adopted, the Supreme
Court held that the amendment only reached discrimination attribut-
able to the action of a state. It was held not to empower Congress
to legislate against discrimination by individuals.
This distinction between private and state action has been scru-
pulously observed by the Court ever since. The decision, though
occasionally questioned in a concurring opinion,' has never been
abandoned and has often been cited as controlling law. " ' The only
significant developments between 1883 and 1964 were (1) changes
in the standard required of the state in giving "equal protection of
the law" and (2) some expansion and refinement of the "state
action" concept.
The evolution of "equal protection" will be considered first. In
1896 the long reign of Jim Crow began when Plessy v. Ferguson"'
construed the "equal protection" requirement to be satisfied by
"separate but equal." This principle was undermined in the post-
World War II law school cases.' 7' In Sweatt v. Painter,7' the Uni-
versity of Texas was required to admit Sweatt to its law school
because the state's law school for Negroes, hastily thrown together
after the instigation of Sweatt's suit, was not and never could be
equal. Physical inequalities were noted, but the Court also relied on
intangible differences such as the white school's tie with the dominant
white culture of the state.
165 Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 136, pt. 1, at 154-55.
16 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See text accompanying note 149 supra.
167 Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 136, pt. 2, at 1299.
16s E.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964) (opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas);
Id. at 286 (opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg).
E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
170 163 U.S. $37 (1896).
171 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
172339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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This line of thinking culminated in the epoch-making case of
Brown v. Board of Education,"' in which it was held that "separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.""..4 Though Brown re-
jected the separate but equal doctrine only with respect to schools,
a series of cases followed swiftly applying the same principle to
other tax-supported facilities such as parks, 7' bathing beaches 7. and
golf courses. "
Other pre-1964 cases expanded the fourteenth amendment's scope
slightly by attributing certain acts of private persons to the state.
Smith v. Allwright"' and Terry v. Adams.7 required private political
organizations which had, in effect, taken over the state function of
holding elections to be subject to the same constitutional require-
ments as the state. Thus was the White Man's Primary outlawed. A
variation on this theme was Marsh v. Alabama,"' in which a com-
pany-owned town was restrained from abridging first amendment
rights in the same way that a municipality would be, by application
of the fourteenth amendment. Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, which
owned the town, had attempted to forbid the distribution of re-
ligious tracts.
Screws v. United States.' construed a statute,"' enacted pursuant
to the fourteenth amendment, which forbids depriving anyone of
constitutional rights by an act done "under color of any law."
Georgia peace officers had killed a prisoner in their custody. The
Court held the statute applied to their action even though the acts
were violations of state law. "It is clear," said the Court, "that under
'color' of law means 'pretense' of law.""'
Other cases found "state action" where the private operation was
very closely tied to that of a public agency. In Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority,"4 a private restaurant leased space from a
facility built with public funds for a public purpose. The Court
found that the restaurant was "an integral part of a public build-
173 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14 347 U.S. at 483.
"'. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958)
aff'd Per curiam 358 U.S. 54 (1959).
17Baltimore City v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 350
U.S. 877 (1955).
'77Homes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S.
879 (1955).
17321 U.S. 649 (1944).
179345 U.S. 461 (1953).
"0 326 U.S. 501 (1946). But see Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87
N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
"' 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
"'2 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958).
83325 U.S. at 111.
'" 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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ing" and held that discrimination by it was forbidden by the four-
teenth amendment. '85 Similar reasoning was involved in Boman v.
Birmingham Transit Co.,18 which invalidated a city bus company's
requirement of segregated seating. It was noted in Boman that (1)
the company had a franchise from the city for use of the public
streets, and (2) a city ordinance authorized the company to issue
seating rules and made disobedience of these rules a breach of the
peace.
Shelley v. Kraemer"' made the greatest extension of the fourteenth
amendment to date. State court enforcement of racially restrictive
deed covenants was held to be unconstitutional state action. The
Court relied, in part, on Buchanan v. Warley"' which had invali-
dated city zoning ordinances based on color. In Shelley, the Court
was careful to make clear that the covenants themselves were unob-
jectionable. The Civil Rights Cases8 were cited and the basic prin-
ciple reiterated that the fourteenth amendment "erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrong-
ful."'" The unconstitutional state action was the "intervention of
the state courts'' 8 ' to prevent a sale between a willing seller and
willing purchaser. Barrows v. Jackson... followed Shelley by refusing
to allow an action for damages for breach of a restrictive covenant.
Some of the language of Shelley seemed to open the door to
invalidation of any act of private discrimination made effective
with the aid of state law enforcement. For example, it was said that
"the Constitution confers upon no individual the right to demand
action by the state which results in the denial of equal protection of
the laws to other individuals.' 8. 3 Whatever this may mean, the Court
has consistently declined to extend it into other fact situations."'
This was made abundantly clear in the sit-in cases decided in the
early 1960's."' The Court was strenuously urged to use the Shelley
185 Id. at 724.
"8280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
187334 U.S. 1 (1948).
188245 U.S. 60 (1917).
189109 U.S. 3 (1883).
"90 334 U.S. at 13.
1"1 Id. at 19.
192 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
19 334 U.S. at 22.
194 See In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958), cert. denied
sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of City of Philadelphia, 357
U.S. 570 (1958); Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955), cert denied,
349 U.S. 947 (1955).
195Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146
(1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267
(1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157 (1961).
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approach to invalidate state trespass convictions of demonstrators
refused service at private restaurants. In the background was the
strife and bitter feeling that accompanied the Negro push for civil
rights during that period. Though obviously sympathetic with the
demonstrators, a majority of the Court was unwilling to hold that
state trespass convictions, like state enforcement of restrictive cove-
nants, violated the fourteenth amendment. Instead, the Court re-
sorted to seemingly strained construction and tortured reasoning to
invalidate the convictions on other grounds."9 '
All the conflicting viewpoints and apparently insoluble problems
involved in trying to apply the fourteenth amendment to private
discrimination came to a head in Bell v. Maryland,"5 ' last of the long
series of 1963-64 sit-in cases. The seventy pages of opinions indicated
a three-way split among the justices. Justices Warren, Goldberg and
Douglas would have applied the fourteenth amendment to dismiss the
convictions. Mr. Justice Douglas declared that segregation was a
"relic of slavery" and that the state, in enforcing segregation, was
denying a constitutional right.' s Mr. Justice Goldberg, with whom
the Chief Justice concurred, agreed with the first Mr. Justice Harlan,
who had dissented in the Civil Rights Cases.' Justice Goldberg con-
tended that "the historical evidence demonstrates that the tradi-
tional rights of access to places of public accommodation" were
secured to Negroes by the fourteenth amendment.2"
Mr. Justice Black, with whom Justices White and Harlan con-
curred, replied with equal conviction that the "historical evidence"
showed nothing of the sort. Referring to the Congressional debates
out of which the post-Civil War amendments developed, he declared
'6Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1962) dealt with the conviction of sit-in
demonstrators under the state's criminal mischief statute which forbade refusal to leave a
place after being asked to by the manager. Louisiana had no statute requiring segregation in
eating places, but the mayor and chief of police had made public announcements that sit-in
demonstrations would not be permitted. The court said: "As we interpret the New Orleans
city officials' statements, they have determined that the city would not permit Negroes to
seek desegregated service in restaurants. Consequently, the city must be treated exactly as if
it had an ordinance prohibiting such conduct." 373 U.S. at 273.
In Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1962), the city had an ordinance re-
quiring segregation in eating places, but the demonstrators were convicted under a local tres-
pass statute. The manager of the lunch counter testified that he refused to serve the Negroes
because it "violated local custom." 373 U.S. at 246. The Court found that the refusal was
state action because in enacting a segregation statute, the state reserved to itself the decision
whether eating places should discriminate.
For discussion of the decisions in this and other sit-in cases, see Kurland, Foreword:
Equal In Origin and Equal In Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Gov-
ernment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 158 (1964).
's' 378 U.S. 226 (1964).




that "not one of the speakers mentioned privately owned accommo-
dations...... The fourteenth amendment, said Mr. Justice Black, does
not reach the individual's decision to discriminate on his private
property, nor does it require the individual to forego police protec-
tion and resort to self-help in carrying out his decision. Shelley was
distinguished in that it involved a willing seller, as opposed to the
unwilling restaurant owner.
A majority was achieved in Bell v. Maryland by a decision which
in effect, avoided a decision. Justices Warren and Goldberg joined with
Justices Brennan, Clark and Stewart in remanding for a state court
determination whether, under state law, the convictions were barred
by the subsequent enactment of a state public accommodations law.
The Maryland Supreme Court, as prior cases indicated it would, on
remand said the convictions were not barred. '
A solution was finally achieved in Hamm v. City of Little Rock.!"
Here the Court held that all the old sit-in convictions must be
vacated because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied retroactively
to protect the demonstrators' actions. The Court relied on the old
common law doctrine of abatement in holding that punishment
could not be inflicted for acts no longer unlawful. In dissenting, Mr.
Justice Black, joined by Justices Harlan, Stewart and White, objected
sharply to the majority's ignoring of the Federal Savings Statute .2"
Considering the fourteenth amendment cases, from the Civil
Rights Cases to Bell v. Maryland, it is obvious that the Justice De-
partment had reason for advising the Senate that the amendment's
"adequacy" as ground for a new public accommodations law was
"subject to significant doubts." ' As finally enacted, the act attempts
to reach only those acts of discrimination which previous cases have
indicated may be attributed to the state.' It may be that the only
purpose the provisions based on the fourteenth amendment will serve
.o Id. at 337. See generally Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights, The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949).
.. Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356, 204 A.2d 54 (1964).
203379 U.S. 306 (1964).
204379 U.S. at 318-28.
20' Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 26, pt.
2, at 1299 (1963).
0 For example, § 201(d) says that discrimination is supported by state action if it is
(1) carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance or regulation; (2) carried on under
color of any custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the state or subdivision; or
(3) is required by action of the state or political subdivision. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
201(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(d) (1964). The first provision parallels Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), where the existence of a segregation ordinance made the
owner's refusal to serve Negroes "state action." It was presumed the owner acted in com-
pliance with the ordinance. The second provision is apparently based on Lombard v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 267 (1963), in which city officials announced they would not permit Negroes to
seek service at segregated lunch counters.
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is to give state officials opposing desegregation detailed advice on
what acts to avoid. It is also possible, however, that the fact that the
act relies on the fourteenth amendment may keep alive the Bell v.
Maryland controversy. A slight shift in Court membership could
make these provisions very potent indeed.
V. DECISIONS UPHOLDING THE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS TITLE
Less than six months after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed,
the Supreme Court put to rest questions of its constitutionality in
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States... and Katzenbach v.
McClung. "' Briefly stated, the decisions, both unanimous, upheld
application of the act to a motel and a restaurant under Congress's
power through the commerce clause. Fourteenth amendment ques-
tions were neither presented nor decided. Mr. Justice Clark wrote the
opinions. Mr. Justice Black, too, probably spoke for all when he
said in his concurring opinion, "It requires no novel or strained in-
terpretation of the Commerce Clause to sustain Title II as applied
in either of these cases."' "
Heart of Atlanta Motel has 216 rooms and is readily accessible
from two interstate highways and two state highways. It solicits
out-of-state patronage via advertising in national magazines and by
billboards and highway signs. Approximately seventy-five per cent
of its guests are persons from outside Georgia. 1'
Respondent in McClung operates Ollie's Barbecue, which is eleven
blocks or more from the nearest highway, railroad station or bus
station. It purchases food valued at approximately $150,000 each
year, of which $69,783 or forty-six per cent of the total is meat
from out of state. It conceded that it was covered by section 201
(c) (2) pertaining to restaurants which obtain a substantial portion
of the food they serve from interstate commerce."'
Petitioner in Heart of Atlanta asserted that the act deprived it of
fifth amendment rights in that it was denied the right to choose its
customers, which resulted in a taking of its liberty and property
without due process of law and a taking of property without just
compensation. 1 ' The Court rejected both the liberty and property
arguments. It relied on "a long line of cases" to the effect that "pro-
hibition of racial discrimination in public accommodations" does
217 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
2" 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
209 379 U.S. at 270-71.
210 379 U.S. at 243.
... Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964).
... 379 U.S. at 244.
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not interfere with personal liberty, at least not liberty as protected
by the Constitution."
The property argument was disposed of by citing cases holding
that similar state and District of Columbia statutes did not violate
"due process." The Court expressed doubt that the motel or restau-
rant would in the long run suffer economic loss as a result of the
act. But even if it did, this was held not sufficient to invalidate legis-
lation considered to be a reasonable means of carrying out a con-
stitutional purpose."4
"The fact that 'a member of the class which is regulated may
suffer economic losses not shared by others, . . .' " said Mr. Justice
Clark, " 'has never been a barrier' to such legislation. 21. The Legal
Tender Cases... were cited as authority that such regulation was not
a "taking" in fifth amendment terms.17 Mr. Justice Black said the
act "does not even come close to being a 'taking' in the constitutional
sense.
, 218
Predictably, the Court "found no merit" in Heart of Atlanta's
contention that requiring it to serve all comers violated the thirteenth
amendment's prohibition against slavery. The act, it said, does nothing
more than "codify the common law innkeeper rule. 21
Both opinions made frequent reference to the record of congres-
sional hearings on the act. The apparent reason for this was to cure
what the three-judge court in McClung had regarded as one of
several fatal flaws in the act-the absence of congressional findings
of fact.22° As the lower court pointed out, previous ground-breaking
acts under the commerce power, such as the National Labor Relations
Act, included preambles carefully setting out the findings of Con-
gress on the ways in which the conduct to be regulated affected inter-
state and foreign commerce. The Civil Rights Act contained no such
findings. This left the door wide open, so the lower court felt, for
a judicial finding, which it made, that there was no connection
between Ollie's Barbecue and interstate commerce.22'
Omission of the usual congressional findings was not for lack of
data submitted to Congress by several of the executive departments.
22
From the record of proceedings, it appears that the usual recital may
2"2 379 U.S. at 260.
214 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22079 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
227 379 U.S. at 261.
21 Id. at 277.
" 9 Id. at 261.
2
20McClung v. Katzenbach, 233 F. Supp. 815, 823 (N.D. Ala. 1964).22 Id. at 823-25.
222 Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 205, pt. 1, at 2.
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have been omitted because the proposed findings were more distaste-
ful to opponents of the bill than the operative provisions."
The Supreme Court, however, was not hindered by the omission.
Mr. Justice Clark emphasized that the Congress had "conducted pro-
longed hearings" and amassed "an impressive array of testimony that
discrimination had a . . . highly restrictive effect upon interstate
travel... ."' In the course of the opinions almost all of the findings
originally offered by the Justice Department were noted."'2
2a Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 205, pt. 1, at 103-105.
224379 U.S. at 300.
2s Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 205, pt. 1, at 2 contains proposed
findings by the Justice Department:
The American people have become increasingly mobile during the last gen-
eration, and millions of Amercan citizens travel each year from state to state
by rail, air, bus, automobile and other means. A substantial number of such
travelers are members of minority racial and religious groups. These citizens,
particularly Negroes, are subjected in many places to discrimination and segre-
gation, and they are frequently unable to obtain the goods and services avail-
able to other interstate travelers.
Negroes and members of other minority groups who travel interstate are
frequently unable to obtain adequate lodging accommodations during their
travels, with the result that they may be compelled to stay at hotels or motels
of poor and inferior quality, travel great distances from their normal routes
to find adequate accommodations or make detailed arrangements for lodging
far in advance of scheduled interstate travel.
Negroes and members of other minority groups who travel interstate are
frequently unable to obtain adequate food service at convenient places along
their routes, with the result that many are dissuaded from traveling interstate,
while others must travel considerable distances from their intended routes in
order to obtain adequate food service.
Goods, services and persons in the amusement and entertainment industries
commonly move in interstate commerce, and the entire American people benefit
from the increased cultural and recreational opportunities afforded thereby.
Practices of audience discrimination and segregation artificially restrict the
number of persons to whom the interstate amusement and entertainment in-
dustries may offer their goods and services. The burdens imposed on interstate
commerce by such practice and the obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce which result therefrom are serious and substantial.
Retail establishments in all states of the Union purchase a wide variety and
a large volume of goods from business concerns located in other states and in
foreign nations. Discriminatory practices in such establishments, which in some
instances have led to the withholdng of patronage by those affected by such
practices, inhibit and restrict the normal distribution of goods in the interstate
market.
Fraternal, religious, scientific, and other organzations engaged in interstate
operations are frequently dissuaded from holding conventions in cities which
they would otherwise select because the public facilities in such cities are avail-
able only on a segregated basis.
Business organizations are frequently hampered in obtaining the services of
skilled workers and persons in the professions who are likely to encounter dis-
crimination based on race, creed, color or national origin in restaurants, retail
stores and places of amusement in the area where their services are needed.
Business organizations which seek to avoid subjecting their employees to such
discrimination and to avoid the strife resulting therefrom are restricted in the
choice of locations for their offices and plants. Such discrimination thus reduces
the mobility of the national labor force and prevents the most effective alloca-
tion of national resources, including the interstate movement of industries,
particularly in some of the areas of the Nation most in need of industrial and
commercial expansion and development.
COMMENTS
In the main, both opinions relied on the long line of commerce
clause cases, from Gibbons v. Ogden"" to Wickard v. Filburn.as and
beyond. They are less remarkable in the scope they give the com-
merce power than some previous cases, such as Mabee,"s Martino''
and Fairlawn.'" But like these cases, the 1964 civil rights cases pose
again the question of where, if anywhere, the chain of causes and
effects linked to interstate commerce ends.
The three-judge court which held the Public Accommodations
Title unconstitutional in the McClung case. 1 indicated where it felt
the stopping place should be. Said the per curiam opinion:
[U]nlike Tennyson's brook, interstate commerce does not run on for-
ever. At some time it must come to an end within the boundaries of
some state.... [W]e have found [no case] which has held that the
national government has the power to control the conduct of people on
the local level because they may happen to trade sporadically with per-
sons who may be traveling in interstate commerce 2
Congress, said the federal district court sitting in Alabama, had legis-
lated a conclusive presumption for which there was no rational sup-
port when it declared that a restaurant affected commerce if it
bought a substantial amount of its products from out of state. Thus,
the lower court concluded, Congress could not control Ollie's re-
tailing practices merely because it purchased forty-six per cent of
its meat from Hormel, an out-of-state firm. To reach this result the
court had to ignore Fairlawn Meats and Reliance Fuel and cite such
discredited cases as Schechter and Carter Coal." The opinion was
probably the last moment of glory for the latter two cases.
In reversing, the Supreme Court looked to the congressional com-
The discriminatory practices described above are in all cases encouraged,
fostered or tolerated in some degree by the governmental authorities of the
states in which they occur, which license or protect the businesses involved by
means of laws and ordinances and the activities of their executive and judicial
officers. Such discriminatory practices, particularly when their cumulative
effect throughout the Nation is considered, take on the character of action by
the states and therefore fall within the ambit of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.
The burdens on and obstructions to commerce which are described above
can best be removed by invoking the powers of Congress under the fourteenth
amendment and the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States
to prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin in
certain public establishments.
'o 6 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See note 31 supra, and accompanying text.
227 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See note 129 supra, and accompanying text.
2 Seee note 141 supra and accompanying text.
2aa See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
230 See note 142 supra and accompanying text.
a1 2 3 3 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
2321d. at 823-24.
2s Id. at 823, n. 14.
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mittee hearings to support the presumption that discrimination by a
restaurant which buys from interstate commerce affects that com-
merce. Congress had determined that a limitation on the market at
the end point caused an "artificial restriction" on the flow of mer-
chandise interstate. "The fewer customers a restaurant enjoys the less
food it sells and consequently the less it buys," said the Court, citing
the committee hearings.23 '
The McClung opinion was confined to answering the question
"whether Title II, as applied to a restaurant receiving about $70,000
worth of food which has moved in commerce, is a valid exercise of
the power of Congress. 23'. It answers this question affirmatively. This
shows that the outer constitutional limit of the commerce power is
not where the Alabama judges declared it to be. It does not, how-
ever, say that the act as applied in McClung represents the full
breadth of Congress's power to regulate a restaurant. Mr. Justice
Clark's recitation in the opinion of the effects of restaurant discrimi-
nation on interstate travel indicate the constitutional standard would
not necessarily depend on the restaurant's serving any particular
percentage of out-of-state food.
Certainly, in the light of Darby... and Wickard v. Filburn," the
constitutional standard would be much broader than the scope of
the act. Where, then, is the limit?
It may be, as suggested by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, that the
"sole restraint" on Congress in regulating commerce is that which
constituents exercise at the polls." s Another sort of limitation has been
indicated by Professor Paul Freund. In a memorandum to the Senate
Commerce Committee while the Civil Rights Act was being con-
sidered, Professor Freund expressed the opinion that the proposed
law was within the reasonable reach of the commerce power, and
compared it with the Child Labor Law:
If a producer wishes to preserve the supposed advantages of child labor,
he must confine himself to a market in his own state. Under the sug-
gested provision, if a retail establishment not otherwise subject to the
commerce definition of the act wishes to preserve the supposed ad-
vantage of a racially selected clientele, it must confine itself to dis-
pensing products of its own state."9
Such regulations have been found reasonable, he said, because inter-
234 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964).
"'Id. at 298.
" United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
2 37 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
238 Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 9 (1824).
339 Statement by Prof. Paul A. Freund, Harvard Law School, as reported in Senate Com-
merce Committee Hearings, supra note 205, pt. 2, at 1185.
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state commerce is utilized to make possible the disapproved operation.
Professor Freund went on to indicate where he felt the limit would
lie:
Adoption of such a proposal would by no means obliterate the limits
on congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Like the great
variety of regulations that have been sustained, this one rests on a
functional relationship between the facilities of interstate commerce
and the abuse or evil at which the federal measure is directed. It would
thus differ fundamentally from hypothetical excesses of federal author-
ity such, for example, as a federal code of marriage or divorce en-
forced by closing of the channels of interstate commerce to violators
of the code.' °
One fact cannot be avoided. In our highly sophisticated economy,
interstate commerce comes to everyone's doorstep. Counsel for the
Heart of Atlanta, in arguing before the Supreme Court, urged the
Court to view the Constitution as the framers intended in 1789. But,
observed one reporter, "[C]omparing 1789 standards to 1964, the
commerce clause exists in different worlds. Then commerce was a
trickle. Modern American capitalism requires that it be a torrent.'241
VI. FUTURE APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT
After Heart of Atlanta and McClung, two questions remain: (1)
Will the states in which segregation traditionally has been practiced
choose to avoid federal regulation by enacting their own public ac-
commodation laws? (2) How far will the act be extended under its
commerce clause provisions?
When the federal act passed, thirty-two states had public accom-
modations laws of their own.2 In recognition of this, Congress has
240 Ibid.
241 Footlick, The Court, Congress, and the Commerce Clause, The National Observer, Oct.
12, 1964, p. 10, col. 5.
242 Alaska Stat. §§ 11.60.230-11.60.240 (1962); Calif. Civ. Code §5 51-54;Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to 25-2-5 (1953); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53-35 (1961); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 6, §§ 4501-16 (Supp. 1964); Idaho Code Ann. 55 18-7301 through 18-7303
(Supp. 1963); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 13-1 to 13-4 (Smith-Hurd 1961), ch. 43, 5 133
(Smith-Hurd 1944); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 10-901 to 10-914 (1961); Iowa Code Ann. 55
735.1-735.2 (1950); Kan. Gen. Star. Ann. § 21-2424 (Supp. 1962); Me. Rev. Star. Ann. 5
17.1301 (1954); Md. Ann. Code, art. 49B, § 11 (Supp. 1964); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 140,
§§ 5, 8 (1957); ch. 272, §§92A, 98 (1963); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.343-28.344 (1962);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 327.09 (1947); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 64-211 (1962); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 20-101 to 20-102 (1954); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5§ 354:1, 354:3, 354:4, 354:5
(1963); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 49-8-1 to 49-8-6 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. Civil Rights Law §
40, 41 (1946); N.Y. Executive Law §§ 290-301 (1964); N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 513-15 (1944);
N.D. Cent. Code, § 12-22-30 (Supp. 1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.35, 2901.36
(Page 1954); Ore. Rev. Stat. §5 30.670, 30.675, 30.680 (1963); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §
4654 (1963); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. 5 11-24-1 to 11-24-6 (1956); S.D. Sess. Laws 1963, c. 58
Vt. Star. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 1451, 1452 (1958); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 49.60 to 49.60.170,




provided that suit may not be brought in federal court until, in
effect, state remedies have been given a chance to operate.' The
states having these laws do not, of course, include the Southern and,
except for Maryland, the Border States. These states, which include
Texas, now have the choice of accepting federal control of rights
and remedies in the field of public accommodations or enacting state
statutes giving substantially the same protection.
Resentment of federal intervention in local affairs is traditionally
strongest in those areas in which there are no state public accommo-
dation statutes. But it does not necessarily follow that this desire for
local control will manifest itself in state civil rights acts. As south-
erners themselves will concede, their history does not show that a
facility for accepting and adapting to changing conditions is among
the regional virtues." It seems probable that in those parts of the
country where resentment of the federal act is strongest, a state act
would be equally obnoxious.
Another possible course open to states that wish to keep the matter
in local hands would be to establish either state or city conciliation
boards. These could be on the order of the Community Relations
Service provided for in the federal statute, but made up of local
people familiar with local problems and feelings. Unofficial groups of
this type operated successfully in some areas prior to passage of the
Civil Rights Act." The federal statute allows for delay to let a state
act only in those states in which a state or local law prohibits dis-
crimination. Hence, such a local conciliation board, unaided by a
local anti-discrimination law, would have to act in advance of the
development of difficulties.
If the states do not choose to act, enforcement will be on the basis
of the federal law. If this should be the case, how far will the federal
act extend? How tiny, how remote from the national commercial
life must a place be before it is beyond the scope of the act? The
answer will depend on what yardstick the courts use in deciding
whether a business "affects commerce."
If the courts use the Wickard v. Filburn' and Mabee v. White
Plains Publishing Co." yardsticks, every hot dog stand in the
24 Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 204(c), 207(b), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-3(c),
2000a-6(b) (1964).
24After passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, United States Representative Charles
Weltner of Georgia said to his colleagues: "I would urge that we now move on to the un-
finished task of building a new South. We must not remain forever bound to another lost
cause." Time, July 10, 1964, p. 26, col. 3.
242 In this area, progress in Texas was cited by Governor John Connally in a statement
printed in Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, suspra note 205, pt. 2, at 1165.
24 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See text accompanying note 129 supra.
247 327 U.S. 178 (1946). See text accompanying note 141 supra and accompanying text.
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country would be covered. In Wickard the wheat raised on eleven
acres was held to affect commerce; in Mabee the sending of forty-five
copies of a newspaper, whose total circulation was only 9,000,
across state lines brought the whole operation under the commerce
power. By this reasoning, the mustard, obtained through interstate
commerce and dispensed by the smallest hot dog stand, would, if
multiplied by all the hot dog stands in the country, surely affect
commerce. Similarly, race discrimination by the nation's thousands
of hot dog stands would inhibit travel by those discriminated against.
There is ground for arguing, however, that in the public accom-
modations title, Congress did not intend to extend its authority so
far. The Supreme Court said in NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp.' s
that in the National Labor Relations Act the Congress intended and
did use the commerce power with "the fullest jurisdictional breadth
constitutionally permissible....' In the public accommodations law,
however, Congress appears to have stopped short of this "fullest
breadth."
In the National Labor Relations Act,50 the scope of application is
set out by a definition of "affecting commerce" in very broad terms.
It means, according to section 152, "in commerce or burdening or
obstructing commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor
dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce." The public accommodations law gives a more detailed
and, possibly, more restricted definition of "affecting commerce" for
restaurants.
An eating place "affects commerce" only if (1) it serves or offers
to serve interstate travelers or (2) a substantial portion of the food
which it serves has moved in commerce. "1 In the McClung case the
amount required to make up a "substantial portion" was not argued.
Approximately forty-six per cent of the meat barbecued at Ollie's
had come from out of state, and the respondent did not contest that
this was substantial. This leaves open the question of whether the
act also would apply to a restaurant which obtained a smaller per-
centage of its food from interstate commerce. Theoretically, a
restaurant could be run without any resort to the interstate market,
and some probably obtain only a few things-e.g., seasonings, bottled
sauces, coffee and tea-through interstate channels.
When then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy appeared before
24' 371 U.S. 224 (1963).
249 Id. at 226.
'
0 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152
(1958).
211 Civil Rights Act of 1964, S 201 (c) (c); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(c) (2) (1964).
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the Senate Commerce Committee, he was pressed several times for
a definition of "substantial portion." His repeated reply was that the
courts have construed "substantial" as "more than minimal. '25 2 Ob-
viously, with the Wickard v. Filburn approach, "minimal" would
reach the disappearing point. The Court might hold, however, that
by specifically restricting the definition of restaurants "affecting com-
merce," Congress only intended to reach those that were dependent
on interstate commerce in a significant way, either for customers
or products.
This line of thinking seems to be reflected in the following passage
from Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta:
I recognize that every remote, possible, speculative effect on commerce
should not be accepted as an adequate constitutional ground to uproot
and throw into the discard all our traditional distinctions between what
is purely local, and therefore controlled by state laws, and what affects
the national interest and is therefore subject to control by federal laws.
I recognize too that some isolated and remote lunchroom which sells
only to local people and buys almost all its supplies in the locality may
possibly be beyond the reach of the power of Congress to regulate com-
merce, just as such establishment is not covered by the present Act."'
(Emphasis added.)
In looking at "remote" effects on commerce, however, Mr. Justice
Black would not abandon the cumulative test. He said:
But in deciding the constitutional power of Congress in cases like the
two before us, we do not consider the effect on interstate commerce
of only one isolated, individual, local event, without regard to the
fact that this single local event when added to many others of a similar
nature may impose a burden on interstate commerce by reducing its
volume or distorting its flow.""
One might speculate that, when measuring the effect of food
bought from interstate commerce, no cumulative test would be ap-
plied because the statute expressly provides that it will apply only
if that restaurant obtains a substantial portion from commerce. Be-
cause, however, the other test-serving or offering to serve intrastate
travelers-is not limited to places who rely on interstate travelers
for any specified portion of their patronage, the cumulative test
might be applicable here.
Previous cases suggest that service or lack of service to interstate
travelers will not be relied upon often, chiefly because it is difficult
to determine. " ' Whatever the restaurant's clientele, the food issue
252 Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 205, pt. 1, at 58.
252 379 U.S. at 275.
214 Ibid.
211 Willis v. Pickrick, 231 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
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almost always will be present in any place of consequence. Today's
restaurant customer is accustomed to a varied fare gathered from
many places.
The other two groups of businesses covered, hotels and places of
entertainment, suggest few, if any future questions. A motel or
hotel attracting enough business to stay alive commercially is not
likely to be cut off from interstate trade."'6 Coverage of the entertain-
ment industry by the commerce power has already been extensively
litigated in anti-trust cases."s
After two stormy decades, future civil rights litigation may shake
down to deciding hair-splitting questions such as the difference be-
tween a "substantial" and "minimal" amount of catsup. If so, the
act will have accomplished what the Supreme Court said Congress
intended-"to obliterate the effect of a distressing chapter of our
history.""
25 Hotels and motels have been held subject to the National Labor Relations Act. Hotel
Employees Local No. 225 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958); NLRB v. Citizens Hotel Co., 313
F.2d 708 (1963).
" See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
"SHamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 315 (1964).
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